



NORTH POLE SECURITY

Santa Past, Present, And Future

A Christmas Carol

Nice To Meet You!



PETE MARKOWSKY

Led all first party security agent development at **Google**, including Santa. Previously co-founded **Capsule8** Linux Cloud EDR company



MATT WHITE

Previous Santa project lead at **Google**. Original author and lead of the **Apple** Endpoint Security Framework



Today's Agenda

- 1** What Is Santa?
- 2** Ghost Of Santa Past
- 3** Ghost Of Santa Present
- 4** Ghost Of Santa Yet To Come



What Is Santa?



What Is Santa?



- An Open Source macOS Security Agent
- Policy enforcement
 - Application allowlisting, file access control, USB media control
- Endpoint telemetry



What Is Santa?



- Performant & Safe
- Effective & Can Be Deployed Next To EDR
- Designed for guard rail style security (social voting)



Guard Rail Security

- Allow security to define the line of what's risky via a risk engine
- Enforcement tools supply context for risk engine to check requests against the line
- Bespoke tools help users safely approve low-risk requests, or alert security
- Tools need to be responsive
- Process is incremental & impact is monitored



Synchronization


Client

Client


Server

Server


Synchronization




Synchronization



Synchronization



Synchronization




What Is Santa


Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture




Santa Architecture



Santa Architecture



Santa Architecture



Ghost Of Santa Past



Deployment At Google

- Agent development done entirely in open source
- Built via in house build system
- Binaries deployed via custom package manager
- Configuration managed via MDM



Rule Management


- Most endpoints run in default deny mode (Lockdown mode)
- Maintaining allowlists not feasible at scale
- Social voting
- First presented at MacDevOps YVR '18



Social Voting

Global Threshold


Local Threshold



Social Voting

Global Threshold


Local Threshold



Social Voting

Global Threshold


Local Threshold



Social Voting

Global Threshold


Local Threshold




Social Voting

Global Threshold


Local Threshold



Typical Release Process



History of Santa



Ghost Of Santa Present




Ghost Of Santa Present

Authorization

S




USB Mass Storage Restrictions



- Blocking USB mass storage devices
- Forcing mount flags
- Exception flow via sync protocol



Binary Authorization




- All executions are evaluated against policy
- **Supported Rule types:**
 - CDHash, Binary Hash, Singing ID, Certificate Hash, Team ID
- Transitive allowlisting
- Lockdown Mode vs. Monitor Mode



Rule Types and Precedence



Rule Types and Precedence



CDHash

Binary Hash

Signing ID

Cert Hash

Team ID

Path Regex



Rule Types and Precedence



CDHash

Binary Hash

Signing ID


Cert Hash

Team ID

Path Regex



Rule Types and Precedence



CDHash

Binary Hash

Signing ID


Cert Hash

Team ID


Path Regex




Rule Types and Precedence



Rule Types and Precedence



Rule Types and Precedence



CDHash

Binary Hash

Signing ID


Cert Hash

Team ID

Path Regex



Rule Types and Precedence




Rule Types and Precedence



- `santactl rule --allow --teamid --identifier EXAMPLETID`
- `santactl rule --block \
--signingid \
--identifier EXAMPLETID:com.example.cloud-storage`




File Access Authorization (FAA)



- Evaluate all file access attempts against policy
- Required OS changes (thanks Apple!)
- Rich policy options
 - Docs on northpole.dev




FAA Policy Example



```
<plist version="1.0">  
<dict>  
  <key>Version</key>  
  <string>v0.1-experimental</string>  
  <key>WatchItems</key>  
  <dict>  
    ...  
  </dict>  
</dict>  
</plist>
```



FAA Policy Example



```
<key>ChromeProfileCookies</key>  
<dict>  
    ...  
</dict>
```



FAA Policy Example



```
<key>Paths</key>
<array>
  <dict>
    <key>Path</key>
    <string>
/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/*/Cookies
    </string>
    <key>IsPrefix</key>
    <true/>
  </dict>
</array>
```



FAA Policy Example



```
<key>Options</key>
<dict>
  <key>AllowReadAccess</key>
  <false/>
  <key>AuditOnly</key>
  <false/>
</dict>
```



FAA Policy Example



```
<key>Processes</key>
<array>
  <dict>
    <key>TeamID</key>
    <string>EQHXZ8M8AV</string>
    <key>SigningID</key>
    <string>com.google.Chrome</string>
  </dict>
  <dict>
    <key>SigningID</key>
    <string>com.apple.mdworker_shared</string>
    <key>PlatformBinary</key>
    <true/>
  </dict>
</array>
```



"Tripwire" FAA Rules

Watch / Lockdown cred files

Bearer tokens, browser cookies, honey tokens

Watch / Lockdown config modifications

SSH authorized_keys files, sudoers, pam

Rich configurations for defining exceptions



Ghost Of Santa Present

Telemetry



Events

- Process lifecycle
- File operations
- Process meta events
- Mounts
- User space events
 - User Login Events



Logging Enhancements

File & Syslog


```
[2024-09-14T01:29:58.820Z] I santad:  
action=EXEC|decision=ALLOW|reason=BINARY|explain=critical system  
binary|sha256=4e10cd6f...|cert_sha256=d84db96a...|cert_cn=Software  
Signing|pid=18909|pidversion=304830|ppid=1|uid=0|user=root|gid=0|  
group=wheel|mode=M|path=/usr/libexec/xpcproxy|args=xpcproxy  
com.google.santa.syncservice
```



Powerful Detection Primitives

Examples

- Process grouping (group/session IDs)
- Usernames
- Process args & environment vars
- setuid
- File descriptor info
- Mount remote address
- Events tied to user activity
- Entitlements



Use Case: Infostealers

1

Initial Access

T1566.001:

Phishing: Spearphishing
Attachment



The malware cannot run until the risk engine and other users approve it

2

Persistence

T1543.004:

Create or Modify System
Process: Launch Daemon

T1543.001:

Create or Modify System
Process: Launch Agent



Santa's file access authorization prevents applications from installing LaunchDaemons or LaunchAgents.

Social voting also prevents any second stage malware from executing

3

Lateral Movement

T1552.004:

Unsecured
Credentials: Private
Keys



Santa's file access authorization detects and prevents read access to sensitive credentials
Santa's telemetry records all process executions and configured file system operations

4

Data Exfiltration

T1539:

Steal Web Session
Cookie



Ghost Of Santa Present

Integrations



Rule Level Customization

`custom_msg`

Lets you customize the message users see per rule

`custom_url`

Lets you control where the open button directs the user



Distributed Notifications

Published on blocked executions


Dictionary of event information

santa-dndump

<https://github.com/northpolesec/santa-dndump>



Distributed Notifications



Rule Configuration



Ghost Of Santa Yet To Come



We're The Team That Made Santa Work At Google



Pete Markowsky

CEO

Led all first party security agent development at Google, including Santa



Russell Hancox

Founding Engineer

One of the two original authors of Santa



Tom Burgin

Founding Engineer

One of the two original authors of Santa



Matt White

Founding Engineer

Led Santa development



We Are Forking Santa!

Our Commitment

- Santa will stay open
- Remain compatible with the sync protocol
- Increased involvement with the community



Join us

github.com/northpolesec/santa



Standalone Santa (Beta)



Even More Presents To Come



Sooner

- Standalone Santa (Beta)
- Telemetry event filtering
- More telemetry events

Later

- Process-based FAA rules
- On demand monitor mode
- Process-Tree-Aware Rules
- Fast path exec authorization

Way Later

- File content checks
- USB blocking enhancements
- Complex policies
- Improved transitive allowlisting



Join Our Santa Community



github.com/northpolesec/santa



northpole.dev - docs



Mac Admins — #santa

Other discussions, issues, PRs, **we're happy to help!**



NORTH POLE SECURITY

**Thank
You!**

